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obviate the apparent difficulties encountered in seeking relief in tort
under the Decedent Estate Law, the plaintiff may have had recourse to
contract had he so elected. 18 The action, if such were the case, would
be instituted on the sole theory of breach of warranty. Obviously, in
following that procedure the plaintiff would be suing for the benefit
of decedent's estate 20 rather than in behalf of the next of kin. The
damages recoverable in the contract action would have been all the
damages suffered by deceased consequentially resulting from the
breach. However, the advisability of proceeding under that theory is
questionable when one considers the enhanced compensation available
in the death action. It is the concensus of judicial opinion that in
proceedings for breach of contract the relief afforded should be limited
to the actual damages suffered by the injured party himself.2 1 This
would, obviously, preclude a third party from maintaining suit in his
own behalf.22 In a death action the plaintiff would be allowed to move
that the jury take into consideration, in computing the damages, such
future pecuniary losses that the beneficiaries under the statute would
suffer.23 The comparative desirability, therefore, of proceeding under
the Decedent Estate Law rather than in contract is self-evident.
J.R.P.
TAXATION-FEDERAL GIFT TAx-ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY.
-Plaintiff and his wife acquired realty in Indiana as tenants by the
entirety. The plaintiff paid the sum of $300,000, personally furnish-
ing the entire consideration. The collector of internal revenue taxed
this transaction as a gift of the purchased realty to the wife. Plaintiff
recovered in the District Court the $16,582 which he paid under pro-
test. On appeal, held, reversed. Where a wife gets realty as a tenant
by the entirety, without paying any consideration therefor, she is a
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96.
' See note 3, supra.
N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 116; Hamilton v. Erie R. R., 219 N. Y. 343,
114 N. E. 399 (1916).
Orester v. Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Co., 228 N. Y. 134, 126 N. E.
510 (1920); Hallock v. Becher and Sackett, 42 Barb. 199 (N. Y. 1864).
' Because of lack of privity no cause of action arises in favor of or
against a stranger to the contract. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y.
468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923).
I Oldfield v. Harlem R. R., 14 N. Y. (4 Kern) 310 (1856); Tilley v.
Hudson River R. R., 29 N. Y. 252 (1864); H ll v. Germain, 131 N. Y. 536,
30 N. E. 591 (1892) ; Sternfels v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 174 N. Y. 512, 66 N.
E. 1117 (1903) (in an action for wrongful death, mortality tables are admissible
to establish decedent's expectancy of life).
RECENT DECISIONS
recipient of a gift and subject to the Federal Gift Tax.1 Lilly v. Smith,
96 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
A conveyance or devise 2 of real property 3 to two persons who
are validly married 4 at the time of the conveyance creates a tenancy
by the entirety,5 in the absence of a dear intention to create a differ-
ent type of estate.6 The essence of such an estate is that each tenant
is seized of the entire property, but neither is seized of an individual
part thereof.7 The estate is held by the legal unity of husband and
wife, and therefore, neither party has any individual interest therein
other than the right to a share in the possession and the rents and
profits.8 The plaintiff in the instant case, relying on the rule that an
estate by the entirety is held by the unity of the husband and wife,
argued: (1) that there was therefore no gift to his wife, (2) that in
the event of her predeceasing him, the tax would in reality be a tax
upon himself, (3) that in any event, the tax should only be based on
one half the value of the land.
In the light of the intrinsic nature of a tenancy by the entirety
it is clear that the wife became seized of the entire fee--and it may
properly be said that there are two separate owners of the same fee.9
147 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. § 537 (1934) : "* * * a tax, * * * shall
be imposed upon the transfer * * * of property by gift." Tax held valid as
excise tax, and not void as direct tax not apportioned. O'Connor v. Anderson,
28 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), aff'd, 280 U. S. 615, 50 Sup. Ct. 81 (1929).
See Hilton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796); Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900).
2The tenants must take by purchase, viz.: by deed or will, and not by
inheritance. WALSH, REAL PROPERY (2d ed. 1927) 359.
. Tenancies by the entirety may only be created in real property, and not
in personalty. Matter of Blumenthall,' 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923) ;
cf. In re Jamaica Bay, 252 App. Div. 103, 297 N. Y. Supp. 415 (2d Dept.
1937).
The existence of the marital relation at the time of the conveyance is
essential, the conveyance being to the unity in all cases. Bambauer v. Schleider,
175 App. Div. 562, 163 N. Y. Supp. 186 (2d Dept. 1917) ; Perrin v. Harrington,
146 App. Div. 292, 130 N. Y. Supp. 944 (4th Dept. 1911). However, it is not
necessary that the relationship of the parties be declared in the grant, it being
sufficient if they are validly married. In re Baffa's Estate, 139 Misc. 298, 248
N. Y. Supp. 332 (1931); In re Snitkin's Will, 151 Misc. 448, 271 N. Y. Supp.
688 (1934).
' This estate gets its name from the legal theory that the marital status is
one inseparable thing. EASTERDAY, REAL PROPERTY (1st ed. 1932) 379.
' While husband and wife are the only persons who may take and own as
tenants by the entirety, it does not follow that they are limited to this kind of
estate; they may take and hold any of the other joint estates known to the law.
Joos v. Fey, 129 N. Y. 17, 29 N. E. 136 (1891); Miner v. Brown, 133 N. Y.
308, 31 N. E. 24 (1892).
1 Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 111, 53 Sup. Ct. 534 (1933), wherein
Sutherland, J., said: "An estate by the entirety is held by the husband and wife
in a single ownership by single title. They do not take by moities, but both
and each take the whole estate, that is to say the entirety." Matter of Klatzl,
216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).8 Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (1895).
Cf. Sutherland, J., in Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 111, 53 Sup.
Ct. 534 (1933) : "An estate by the entirety is held by the husband and wife in
a single ownership by single title." (Italics ours.)
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Hence the justification for the gift tax. The second contention of the
plaintiff is unanswerable, unless we are to say that he may not in
fact outlive his wife and that the taxing authority of Congress cannot
await a death of one of the parties before it imposes a gift tax. The"
third contention must likewise give way inasmuch as she has become
seized of the entire fee, as previously stated, by the conveyance. Upon
the death of either spouse, the Federal Estate Tax 10 could be imposed
upon the property."1 Although it is conceded that each is seized of
the whole in his own right, still the enjoyment of the benefits and
profits of the property must be shared while both are alive.12 Hence
the courts justify this tax on the theory that the death of one tenant
by the entirety results in the enjoyment of additional rights by the
survivor. 13 But if it can clearly be shown that the surviving spouse
originally owned part of the estate subsequently held by them as ten-
ants by the entirety, then such part of the estate is not included in the
Federal Estate Tax.14 Similarly if a federal gift tax has been paid,
the statute specifically -permits the crediting of such amount paid to
the amount to be paid as the estate tax.1 It is to be noted that thie
New York Tax Law ' 6 expressly provides that upon the death of one
tenant by the entirety, the estate is subject to a transfer tax. This
tax is separate and distinct from the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,
1144 STAT. 69 (1926), 26 U. S. C. §410 (1934) : "A tax * * * is hereby
imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent * * * whether a
resident or non-resident of the United States."
"Goodenough v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
"- Matter of Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).
'Is there any distinction between 'the real estate itself, or its owner in
respect to it, and the rents or income coming to the owners? 1 JARMON, WILLS(5th ed.) § 798 states that "a devise of the rents and profits or of the income
of lands passes the land itself both at law and in equity." Paterson, J., in
Hylton v. United States, 3 Dal]. 171, 177 (U. S. 1796) states, " * * * land
independently of its produce, is of no value." See Levy's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 65 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; Matter of Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83,
110 N. E. 181 (1915).
", Foster v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
147 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. § 537 (1934) : "If a tax has been
paid * * * on a gift * * * upon the death of donor * * * there shall be credited
against the tax * * * so much of the property which constituted the gift."1 N. Y. TAx LAW § 220, subd. 5, as amended by Laws of 1915, c. 664,
provides that "Whenever property is held * * * as tenants by the entirety * * *
upon the death of one of such persons the right of the surviving tenant * * *
to the immediate possession and enjoyment of such property, shall be taxable
* * * as though * * * one-half of the property belonged absolutely to the
deceased tenant * * *" Under this subdivision it has been held that an estate
by the entirety is taxable to the extent of one-half the value of the property.
Matter of Moebus, 178 App. Div. 709, 165 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dept. 1917).
Even before the amendment it was held that the interest of a tenant by the
entirety passing to husband or wife was a taxable transfer on the death of
either, to the extent of one-half the value of the property. Matter of Klatzl,
216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915). See concurring opinion of Bartlett, J.,
in the same case.
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and must be paid regardless of whether the federal taxes have been
paid. 17
H.K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
NEGLIGENCE.--Defendant entered into an agreement with a contract-
ing firm whereby the latter was to do its construction work and fur-
nish all necessary labor. However, defendant was to have the right
of general supervision. The purpose of this arrangement was to evade
the payment of premiums on accident insurance. Deceased was for-
merly employed by the defendant, but under the agreement he was
discharged by the defendant and hired by the construction firm. He
was killed because of the negligence of the defendant and the admin-
istratrix brings this action under Section 130 of the Decedent Estate
Law. The defense is (1) that although deceased was hired by the
construction firm, the defendant retained general supervision over all
the work and the employees, and hence deceased was in the employ
of defendant; (2) that the contract between defendant and the con-
struction firm did not express the real intent of the parties; and (3)
that since in fact deceased was in the employ of defendant, the sole
remedy is under the Workmen's Compensation Law.' On appeal
from a reversal by the Appellate Division of a judgment for the plain-
tiff, held, reversed and new trial granted. The action was properly
brought in negligence. The reversal by the Appellate Division on the
ground that there was a master and servant relationship was against
the weight of evidence; but because of apparently inconsistent findings
of fact by the jury, a new trial should be held. Wawrzonek v. Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., 276 N. Y. 412, 12 N. E. (2d) 527
(1938).
Prior to the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Law in
1922, the common law rule of master and. servant was the basis of
11 ,* * * by the Constitution the States not only gave to the nation the
concurrent power to taxc persons and property directly, but * * *." Fuller, C. J.,
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895).
In Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 53 Sup. Ct. 534 (1933), in com-
menting upon the possible hardship to individuals subject to both federal and
state taxes, the court said, "If the legislation hereunder review results in
imposing an unfair burden upon the taxpayer, the remedy is with Congress and
not with the courts. Unless there is a violation of the Constitution, Congress
may select the subjects of taxation * * *"
' N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 11: "The liability of an
employer * * * shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability * * *."
Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795 (1916)
(right to compensation is exclusive remedy where master and servant relation-
ship exists); Lee v. Cranford, Inc., 182 App. Div. 191, 169 N. Y. Supp. 370
(2d Dept. 1918).
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